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Existing research explains variation in trade attitudes by pitting explana-
tions rooted in the foreign part of foreign economic policy, like nativism,
against economic beliefs like a commitment to free market principles. But
what happens when these factors create significant cross-pressures—how
do free market-oriented nativists think about trade? We argue that na-
tivism is a higher-order belief that constrains the relationship between
lower-order economic attitudes and beliefs about international trade. We
test our argument using representative samples from the United States
and United Kingdom. First, we analyze observational data and find a sig-
nificant interaction whereby nativism moderates the relationship between
free market attitudes and beliefs that trade provides national and global
benefits. Second, we report results from a survey experiment to show that
a message about the long-term benefits from free trade increases support
for free trade in both samples. Importantly, we also find that nativist values
weaken the treatment effect in the US sample. As long as international re-
lations scholars focus on cultural or economic antecedents on their own,
we miss much about how elements in belief systems interact.
Introduction
Political scientists have accumulated substantial individual-level evidence that cit-
izens in Western democracies, like the United Kingdom and United States,
often hold protectionist views that contradict economists’ pro-globalization
consensus (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001;
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Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005; Kuo and Naoi 2015). To
explain variation in trade attitudes, scholars typically pit explanations rooted in the
foreign part of foreign economic policy—such as ethnocentrism, out-group anxiety,
and social trust (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Kinder and Kam 2010; Margalit 2012;
Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013)—against a broad class of economic factors like mate-
rial self-interest (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005), information
deficits (Guisinger 2017; Rho and Tomz 2017), and fiscal conservatism (Rathbun
2016). In particular, people who believe that the free market should rule at home
translate that belief to the international economy and support classically liberal
trade policies.
But what happens when these foreign and economic antecedents create signifi-
cant cross-pressures? For example, nativists fear outsiders and see peril in foreign
entanglements—people who hold nativist values reject free trade in favor of protec-
tionist policies (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Kinder and Kam 2010; Margalit 2012).
Yet right-of-center partisans who are more likely to hold nativist views also have
a “well-known faith in free markets” (Mutz and Kim 2017, 843), a position that
should dispose them to support open trading and see opportunities in international
exchange (Wolfe and Mendelsohn 2005; Rathbun 2016; Jungherr et al. 2018; Wu
2019).
We build on previous research to test the interaction between nativism and free
market ideology, two important precursors to attitudes about trade. In line with
“vertical” models of foreign policy attitudes (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Chittick,
Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Goren et al. 2016), we argue that both cultural fear and
economics matter, but that higher-order concerns about protecting the in-group
constrain the effects of lower-order economic beliefs. For nativists, domestic free
market beliefs do not extend beyond the water’s edge to international trade.
Using original data from representative samples in the United States and United
Kingdom, we find evidence that both complement and complicate what we know
about trade attitudes. First, we analyze cross-sectional survey data and show that
both nativism and free market attitudes are associated with individuals’ beliefs about
the costs and benefits from trade (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Guisinger 2017;
Rho and Tomz 2017). Nativists believe that trade harms both their own country
and the world, whereas free market enthusiasts believe that trade is broadly helpful.
But consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find a significant interaction
whereby nativism moderates the relationship between free market attitudes and be-
liefs that trade does more good than bad. The positive relationship between free
market attitudes and views about globalized trade weakens as respondents become
more nativist. Second, we use an embedded experiment to evaluate whether na-
tivism limits the causal effect of a message describing how open international mar-
kets promote growth. Although the message about trade’s long-term benefits for
developed countries increases support for tariff reductions in both samples, nativist
values weaken the treatment effect in the US sample.
Economics and Trade Attitudes
Contrary to the pro-trade consensus among economists, members of the mass
public are divided: Some support economic liberalization, some demand pro-
tections for domestic markets, and others express uncertainty (Guisinger 2009;
Kleinberg and Fordham 2017). Moreover, variation in trade attitudes reflects a
broader disagreement about the costs and benefits associated with protectionist
policies (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001; Guisinger 2017; Rho and Tomz
2017). To explain this variation in both attitudes and beliefs, scholars point to
economic beliefs, material interests, and associated information deficits, on one
hand—including the free market beliefs that we focus on in our theory and empir-
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on the other.1 Each approach contributes to how we understand public attitudes
toward trade.
Broadly, economic approaches contend that trade attitudes depend on trade’s
real or perceived material effects. One version of this approach relies on the “open
economic model” to test whether trade attitudes follow from an individual’s position
in the labor market (e.g., Lake , 2009a). Trade agreements create domestic winners
and losers, and people whose pocketbook benefits from access to foreign markets
should support free trade (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Beaulieu 2002; Mayda and
Rodrik 2005; Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). In Western democracies where un-
skilled labor is scarce whereas human capital is abundant, citizens without a college
education support protectionist policies at greater rates than their degree-holding
counterparts (Scheve and Slaughter 2001).2
Models that link economic self-interest to trade attitudes have “come under fire”
in response to evidence that (1) proxies for skill level lose their predictive power
when we include other individual-level factors in our models (Mansfield and Mutz
2009) and (2) most people lack accurate information about how trade policy affects
them (Rho and Tomz 2017, S88; see also Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Guisinger
2017). On the first point, recent work has moved beyond rough proxies to show that
measurement makes a difference—when scholars account for occupation character-
istics (Owen and Johnston 2017) or put a “magnifying glass” on policies with clear
and concentrated distributional effects (Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013), they
find stronger evidence that material interests play a role in economic attitudes.3
However, on the second point, researchers find that neither the pocketbook effects
implicated by trade’s distributional consequences nor the pro-trade “Econ 101” ar-
guments that academics embrace percolate throughout the public. Indeed, many
Americans seem to spend little time thinking about trade policy (Guisinger 2009,
2017). Experiments demonstrate that people can and do update their preferences
in response to new information (Hiscox 2006; Rho and Tomz 2017; Bearce and
Moya 2020) or pro-trade political messages (Guisinger 2017). But the results also
reveal important nuances: Some people respond with altruism rather than egoism
(Rho and Tomz 2017) and treatment effects are weaker among some demographic
groups (Guisinger 2017). Average effects may mask meaningful heterogeneity—a
point we return to below.
Material interests matter sometimes for some people, but without an experimen-
tal prompt or a “crash course” in economic theory (Kertzer et al. 2019, 6), many
individuals draw from other economic cues and ideas to form their opinions about
trade (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012; Kuo and Naoi 2015). First, people can turn
to their beliefs about how trade affects the national or local community econ-
omy. Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 427), for example, show that Americans’ trade
attitudes are sociotropic—related to “perceptions of how trade affects the country
as a whole.”4 Colantone and Stanig (2018) similarly claim that the “Chinese im-
port shock,” which caused economic distress in some parts of the United Kingdom,
helps explain Brexit support. Although a thriving community can affect individual
1
Scholars often treat explanations rooted in material self-interest, like labor market position, as separate from
economic predispositions or sociotropic perceptions. We discuss these elements together due to their shared attention
to free trade’s economic implications, though different research designs are better suited to testing propositions about
material self-interest in particular (Owen and Walter 2017).
2
Although much of the research in this program tests hypotheses based on the Stolper–Samuelson factor endow-
ments model, others like Beaulieu (2002) test the Ricardo–Viner specific factors model. Consistent with the specific-
factors hypothesis, Beaulieu find evidence that trade supporters disproportionately work in export-oriented markets.
3
See Owen and Walter (2017) for a review and discussion of how material interests have more explanatory power
when they are measured correctly, especially pages 188–191.
4
Mansfield and Mutz (2009) further argue that trade attitudes are shaped by out-group anxiety (though cf.
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prosperity,5 the authors find that people living in negatively affected regions were
more likely to vote “Leave” regardless of whether their individual circumstances
had changed. As an empirical matter, Guisinger (2017) finds a substantial degree
of overlap between sociotropic and egoistic perceptions; Americans who think that
trade helps others also believe that trade bolsters their own prospects (and vice
versa).
Second, people can use their broader economic ideology as a guide for their spe-
cific attitudes toward trade—including as a precursor to their perceptions of trade’s
effects. Free market beliefs provide a useful shortcut to evaluate a complicated set
of policies. Economic conservatism and commitment to the the free market predict
support for free trade in the United States and Canada (Wolfe and Mendelsohn
2005; Rathbun 2016). In East Asia, Wu (2019, 4) also finds that people who think
that the government should bear responsibility for citizens’ well-being “favor pro-
tectionism over laissez-faire.” In short, people project their beliefs about domestic
markets to the international sphere. Importantly, theories about economic ideol-
ogy as an antecedent for trade attitudes only require that members of the public
align their views with what they believe will produce material benefits—they do not
require that people have accurate ideas about the global economy. These free mar-
ket beliefs represent one key component of the cross-cutting pressures that motivate
our puzzle.
Nativism and Protectionism
Faith in the free market joins other economics-oriented factors to explain some
of the variance in trade attitudes—but opening domestic markets to international
competition carries symbolic implications too. British consumers might appreciate
cheaper clothing, but scoff at a “made in Vietnam” label because it means that an
out-group produced the product. And, indeed, many scholars argue that trade at-
titudes stem from psychological and symbolic predispositions rather than material
concerns or economic ideas (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013, see Kuo and Naoi 2015
for a review). In line with this emphasis on the foreign in ‘foreign competition’,
we focus on nativism’s role in shaping public support for protectionism. Although
other values might play a role in public opinion about trade (Mayda and Rodrik
2005), we turn to nativism—“the individual-level attitude that a uniquely [national]
culture and way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence” (Knoll and
Shewmaker 2015, 88)—to help consolidate the many studies that implicate out-
group attitudes under a unified banner and test a key source of partisan cross-
pressures (e.g., Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mutz and Kim 2017).
Nativism is a value that shapes how people respond to problems in the politi-
cal domain, and in particular to foreign policy. Like other domain relevant values
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), nativism sits atop a hierarchy that ranges from abstract
commitments to concrete policy preferences. In such a hierarchy, abstract, higher-
order guides constrain lower-order beliefs like economic ideology and trade policy
preferences. Specifically, Schwartz (1994, 20) argues, “A value is a (1) belief (2) per-
taining to desirable end states or modes of conduct, that (3) transcends specific sit-
uations, (4) guides selection or evaluation of behavior, people, and events.” Values
provide an intuitive shortcut: Faced with a complicated situation or policy choice,
an individual can make a quick judgment based on her “gut response” (Haidt 2001).
Nativism serves this function by providing a strict definition for who belongs to the
national in-group and evoking a person’s desire to protect that group. There are few
constructs more fundamental than in-group/out-group distinctions when it comes
5
For example, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) show that a large import shock has broad, community-level effects
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to political judgment (Kinder and Kam 2010), such that nativism serves as an im-
portant guide to the complex world of international trade.6
To maintain a homogeneous nation-state, nativists oppose “foreign cultural in-
fluence” and are wary of non-native ideas and customs that undermine their tradi-
tional way of life (Margalit 2012). New arrivals bring undesirable variety to the na-
tivist’s home country. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) and Van der Waal and De Koster
(2018) find associations between ethnocentrism and protectionism in the United
States and Netherlands, respectively, while Margalit (2012) presents cross-national
evidence that people who fear foreign cultural influence also believe that they are
personally harmed by trade liberalization. Antipathy to others can in some instances
be so great that Americans will only support trade policies that offer hardly any ben-
efit to a trading partner (Mutz and Kim 2017).
At the same time, nativism has analytical purchase beyond trade—a fact that
underscores its centrality within political belief systems. Sides and Citrin (2007)
show that opposition to immigration correlates with a broader preference for cul-
tural unity, and Schildkraut (2005) similarly links ethnoculturalism to support for
English-only laws. Nativism predicts support for radical right parties in Europe
(Zhirkov 2014), and—in conjunction with anti-elitism—Brexit support (Iakhnis
et al. 2018). McConnaughy et al. (2010) find that nativism shapes coethnic can-
didate evaluations in the United States, and Knoll and Shewmaker (2015) show
that nativists oppose domestic policies like the Affordable Care Act when they are
framed as “un-American.” In short, the collective empirical record suggests that
when a policy or candidate arouses concerns about mixing foreign people, ideas, or
products domestically, nativists react with opposition.
Theoretical Expectations
We expect that nativism and free market attitudes separately shape beliefs about
international trade and support for specific policies. Nativists conclude that trade is
harmful and oppose lowering tariffs, whereas free market proponents believe that
free trade brings important benefits. But when a higher-order value clashes with
economic beliefs, the former will constrain the latter (Prather 2017)—nativism will
6
We are confident in characterizing nativism as a value and therefore causally prior to trade attitudes for several re-
inforcing reasons. First, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that emphasizes the importance of in-group/out-
group distinctions in evaluation and decision-making contexts (Kinder and Kam 2010). Out-group intolerance has both
historical and neurological roots (Sapolsky 2019; Homola, Pereira, and Tavits 2020), and group distinctions affect po-
litical beliefs from partisanship and polarization (Mason 2015; Huddy and Bankert 2017) to militarism (Herrmann,
Isernia, and Segatti 2009) and social welfare (Kinder and Kam 2010). As noted in the text, research demonstrates that
nativism predicts attitudes toward immigration and candidate evaluation in addition to beliefs about trade—consistent
with Schwartz’s (1994) assertion that values transcend specific situations. Second, these concepts are clearly embed-
ded in leading comprehensive theories of values. Opposition to change and outside influences are encompassed in
Schwartz’s (1994) tradition and security dimensions and Haidt and Graham’s (2007) loyalty and purity dimensions
(with the latter in each case a slightly more abstract concern). Third, as an empirical matter, our nativism scale shows
significant stability over time. Data used in this paper were part of a larger panel study where a select set of the nativism
questions were asked at multiple timepoints, three for the US study (spring 2012, summer, 2013, late 2018) and four in
the United Kingdom (spring 2012, summer 2013, spring 2014, late 2018). First-order autoregressive paths connecting
nativism across timepoints indicated high over-time stability: Lagged 2012 nativism values explain 92 percent of the
2013 variance on nativism in the United States and 94 percent in the United Kingdom, for example. We also observe
striking stability between 2014 and 2018, a time period that saw both the election of Donald Trump and acrimonious
debate over immigration in the United States and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom. Nativism from 2014 explains
69 percent of the 2018 variance in the United States and 78 percent of the variance among UK respondents. These
results are consistent with what we would expect from a value that lies at the center of an individual’s belief system and
constrains lower order attitudes (Goren 2005; see Online Appendix Section 1.2 for additional details). Although theory
and evidence therefore lead us to conclude that nativism constitutes a value, a skeptical reader might disagree due to
the policy implications associated with nativist beliefs. This logic would move nativism one step down in a hierarchical
belief structure—akin to the mid-level “general postures” like militarism that mediate the relationship between values
and specific policies in Hurwitz and Peffley’s (1987) influential model—but it would remain causally prior to beliefs
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blunt the influence of economics on how members of the public think about trade.
We test these expectations using both observational and experimental data.
To evaluate the relationship between nativism, free market attitudes, and public
opinion about trade, we first turn to their associations with two sets of beliefs about
international trade.
On one hand, we know that people tend to hold consistent and reinforcing
views about trade’s domestic effects—it either helps or harms the nation in gen-
eral (Guisinger 2017). Those who believe that trade encourages national economic
growth will also believe that it bears fruit for domestic consumers and helps factory
workers, for example. Nativists, whose apprehension about openness leads them
to prefer a closed homeland (Margalit 2012), conclude that trade harms the na-
tion’s economy whereas free market proponents tout the benefits from lower tariffs
(Rathbun 2016; Wu 2019).
Although previous research has provided consistent support for an association
between our key independent variables and beliefs about trade’s domestic effects,
we also measure participants’ beliefs about how open trading affects the world. We
expect that nativists will reject claims that trade is a global good.7 The relationship
between nativism and beliefs about trade’s global effects provides an important test
for our theory: If nativist opposition to trade depended on rationally weighing the
costs and benefits from trade, nativist values should be unrelated to beliefs about
broader, global effects that do not carry domestic consequences. Instead, we argue
that nativist values will automatically arouse a negative reaction to the prospect of
mixing foreign goods and cultures anywhere. Values lead us to evaluate situations
based on our emotional “gut” reactions (Haidt 2001). Driven by their abstract com-
mitment to cultural homogeneity and a summary assessment that globalization is
“bad,” nativists, in turn, believe that trade brings global harm. We also expect those
who oppose government intervention in the economy to apply their intuitions to
trade: For economic liberals, free trade offers the best path to global development
just as it facilitates growth at home. This logic leads to our first two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a: Nativism will be associated with negative beliefs about trade’s effects
on the nation and the world.
Hypothesis 1b: Free market beliefs will be associated with positive beliefs about trade’s
effects on the nation and the world.
Evidence to support hypotheses 1a and 1b will largely confirm the conventional
wisdom on both sides of the divide about what shapes trade attitudes. However, if
core values entail an automatic reaction and constrain the effects of lower-order
beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), then people high in nativism may support pro-
tectionist policies despite the fact that they endorse the free market domestically.
Mutz and Kim (2017) hint at this relationship when they argue that nationalism
and social dominance orientation, characteristics that are correlated with Republi-
can partisanship, enhance support for trade agreements in which the United States
maximizes relative—rather than joint—gains. We expect that nativists, who priori-
tize in-group protection over government deregulation, will have a weaker relation-
ship between free market attitudes and positive beliefs about trade. This moderating
effect has important implications for contemporary politics. If nativism attenuates
the relationship between faith in markets and pro-trade beliefs, it could help to
explain the protectionist turn in the US GOP (Grand Old Party) and, to a lesser
extent, right-wing parties in the United Kingdom.
7
For example, nativists might point to the idea that the migration of skilled workers from less developed countries
creates “brain drain” and that the “process of globalization” may increase political instability. For evidence on the
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Hypothesis 2: Nativism will moderate the relationship between free market beliefs
and beliefs about trade. The positive relationship between belief in the free market
and trade attitudes will weaken as nativism increases.
Finally, if nativism constrains the effect of beliefs about the economy, committed
nativists will maintain their opposition to trade even when they are exposed to a
message that lays out the prospects for prosperity under an open economic system.
Most people who learn about national-level gains from trade advocate for lower tar-
iffs (Mutz and Kim 2017), and people update their policy preferences in response
to information and elite cues (Guisinger 2017; Rho and Tomz 2017; Bearce and
Moya 2020). At the same time, we know that people do not respond to persuasive
messages in a vacuum (Lodge and Taber 2013). Values work in the background to
shape how we interpret messages and how—or whether—we update our attitudes
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; see Kertzer and Powers 2019 for a review). If any foreign
influence is “fundamentally threatening” (Mudde 2007), nativists will not update
their support for tariffs in response to a short lesson about the free market. Eco-
nomic benefits do not outweigh the cultural costs.8
To test our proposition that nativism moderates the effect of pro-market mes-
sages about trade, we embed an experiment in both surveys that randomly assigns
a message about how open trading improves the national economy in the long run.
Whereas the survey measures beliefs about whether people are better off in a free
market economy, the experiment targets those beliefs directly by providing a com-
mon macroeconomic argument about how open trading redounds to citizens’ mate-
rial benefit. We build on recent experimental work showing that Americans support
trade when the United States stands to gain jobs (Mutz and Kim 2017; Bearce and
Moya 2020), but we focus on long-term trends rather than the effects of a particular
trade agreement. One political argument in favor of trade depends on the idea that
liberal trade policies have long time horizons—industries that do not have a com-
parative advantage may suffer in the short term, but stronger economies abroad
eventually open new markets to goods produced at home.9 When nations break
down trade barriers, economies thrive in the long run. We expect that exposure to
this message increases support for free trade, but also that values matter: Long-term
benefits from a free market approach to trade may not move nativists to support
lower tariffs.
Hypothesis 3: Exposure to a political message touting trade’s long-term national ben-
efits will increase support for free trade.
Hypothesis 4: Nativism will moderate the effect of a political message touting trade’s
long-term national benefits. The effect of the treatment will weaken as nativism in-
creases.
Nativism, Free Market, and Beliefs about Trade
We conducted nationally representative surveys of 2,346 American and 2,349 British
participants in 2012. We selected the United States and United Kingdom for two rea-
sons. First, our theory engages research that heavily relies on American samples—
perhaps because the United States is the world’s largest economy—and we aim to
test our expectations about cross-pressures using the same population as past work.
Second, although the United States and United Kingdom are both independently
8
In this respect, our argument complements Mutz and Kim (2017), who find that people with high social dom-
inance orientation prefer trade agreements in which the United States gains while their trading partner loses. They
prefer relative to absolute gains more than their low-social dominance orientation counterparts.
9
Although macroeconomists tend to agree that trade has positive long-term effects on economic growth, including
jobs, there is considerably more disagreement with respect to the short- and medium-term effects of free trade on jobs
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interesting given their positions in the globalized economy, the paired samples al-
low us to probe the theory’s generalizability. The United States and United King-
dom share memberships in both NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and
the G-7 and cultural similarities. And although some research finds evidence for
similar foreign policy attitude structures (Reifler, Scotto, and Clarke 2011), others
report key differences in the cross-national correlates of these attitudes (Scotto and
Reifler 2017).
While the primary independent and dependent variables are drawn from a single
cross-sectional survey, the data are part of a larger panel study. We include indepen-
dent variables from a prior wave when available.
Dependent Variable: Latent Beliefs about Trade
Scholars often model trade attitudes using single items available on prominent sur-
vey instruments. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) rely
on data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), for example, which
asks participants whether they agree that their home country “should limit the im-
port of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.”10 An item on
the ANES (American National Election Studies) describes pro- and anti-trade posi-
tions before asking participants if they favor new limits on imports (see, e.g., Scheve
and Slaughter 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). The Latinobarometro survey
(Beaulieu, Yatawara, and Wang 2005), National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES;
Mansfield and Mutz 2009), and World Values Survey (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013)
ask about support for particular protectionist or liberal policies like restricting im-
ports to protect domestic jobs, and the Chicago Council surveys ask if participants
“believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of our economy
with others around the world, is good or bad for the United States?” (Mansfield
and Mutz 2009, 435).11
These measures “allow scholars to solicit citizens’ gut-based, general reactions to
trade” and have been instrumental in advancing our knowledge (Kuo and Naoi
2015, 102). They are appropriate for research on policy preferences, and are avail-
able on national and cross-national surveys. However, as Guisinger (2017, 4) points
out, trade policy is interesting in part because “its implications are neither primarily
domestic nor international,” and we want to understand how values and economics
relate to beliefs about both sets of beliefs. In particular, we need to test whether na-
tivist values shape beliefs about trade’s global effects to demonstrate its centrality in
individuals’ belief systems. Moreover, beliefs about trade’s effects correlate with atti-
tudes toward specific policies (Mansfield and Mutz 2009), and understanding where
these beliefs come from remains an important research question (Guisinger 2017).
We therefore include a prompt that asks participants, “Do you think globalization—
the increased trade between countries in goods, services, and investments—has had
a negative effect, no effect, or a positive effect on each of the following?” Eight target
items, listed in table 1, tap national and global effects (see, e.g., Woodward, Skrbis,
and Bean 2008 and Bechtel, Bernauer, and Meyer 2012 for similar approaches).12
Four items ask about the domestic effects of trade. Following sociotropic theories,
we ask about the American (British) economy in general. The other three items
target specific groups—businesses, consumers, and factory workers. Each of these
categories has a different relationship with the globalized economy (Lake , 2009b),
but we expect that they comprise a single latent dimension that taps perceptions of
trade’s national effects.
10
See the documentation for ISSP Research Group (1995).
11
See Kuo and Naoi (2015) for a review of survey measures of trade attitudes.
12
Although the eight items do not exhaust the myriad ways that trade affects national or global politics—and do
not account for individual or community-level factors (Guisinger 2017)—they represent a range of important outcomes
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Table 1. CFA: effects of trade
United States United Kingdom
Global National Global National
benefits benefits benefits benefits
Improving women’s rights in developing countries 0.758 0.710
Providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor countries 0.792 0.857
Reducing the chances of war between nations 0.686 0.157 0.560 0.208
American (British) factory workers −0.197 0.913 −0.226 0.841
Improving democracy and human rights in developing countries 0.818 0.719
The American (British) economy 0.953 0.906
The average American (British) consumer 0.238 0.634 0.344 0.486
American (British) businesses 0.832 0.892
Notes. The table reports the standardized results of the CFA, which generates factor scores for the
“Global” and “National” benefits of trade utilized as dependent variables in the multivariate analyses
to follow. Final fit statistics of the model are as follows: United States: χ2 = 37.14(df = 15), RMSEA
= 0.03, CFI = 1.00; United Kingdom: χ2 = 89.68 (df = 15), RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.99. Correlation
between “Global” and “National” factors: US = 0.65; UK = 0.50. Error correlation between “Improving
women’s rights…” and “Improving democracy and human rights…”: US = 0.41; UK = 0.48 (not used in
the derivation of factor scores utilized below).
Second, we measure whether people believe that trade has negative or positive in-
ternational consequences with four items. One draws inspiration from theories that
connect economic interdependence to peace (Russett and Oneal 2001) and asks
whether participants think that trade reduces prospects for war. The other three
draw from political economy research on the relationship between trade and de-
velopment and democratization and ask about whether the liberal international
economy is good for developing countries (Milner 1999; Milner and Kubota 2005).
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on these eight items revealed a two-factor
solution in both the United States and United Kingdom. Factor scores estimated
from the two factors—“national benefits” and “global benefits” of globalized trade—
comprise our dependent variables. The first factor is positively correlated with be-
liefs that globalization has a positive effect on women’s rights, poor countries’
economies, the prospect of interstate war, and human rights abroad. The second
factor is positively correlated with beliefs that economic globalization has positive
sociotropic effects—it helps the national economy in general alongside specific
groups in society.13
Independent Variables
To evaluate hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2, we include two key independent variables:
nativism and support for free markets. Additive scales for nativism based on eight
(United States, α = 0.85) or nine items (United Kingdom, α = 0.90) tap par-
ticipants’ antipathy to immigrants and preference for a homogeneous homeland
(Iakhnis et al. 2018).14 The nativism items comprise a single latent factor and tap
13
See Online Appendix Section 3 for a thorough discussion of measurement validity. One possible concern is that
our primary independent variable, nativism, and dependent variables, beliefs about globalization, are co-constitutive.
In Online Appendix Section 3.1, we show that nativism and trade attitudes form distinct latent factors.
14
Survey items and sample characteristics are included in Online Appendix Sections 1 and 2. The nativism scale
was not included in the 2011 wave, but preceded the globalization questions in the survey instrument for the 2012 wave.
We also estimate our models using a shorter, two-item version of the nativism scale that excludes any immigration refer-
ences. Though we lose precision with this shorter scale, the results in Online Appendix Section 6 are largely consistent
with the findings we report here and give us additional confidence that latent nativism values play an important role in
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the cultural fears and group-based distinctions at the heart of the construct. To
measure our other key predictor variable, free market attitudes, we include a single
item from the 2011 survey wave that asks participants if they agree or disagree that
“people are better off in a free market economy.” This item separates economic lib-
eralism from other elements of political ideology, since people “keep orientations
across policy domains … largely distinct” (Feldman and Johnston 2014, 338). Its
precision also lends cross-national construct validity to our analysis, because abstract
measures of liberalism/conservatism imply a different set of priorities to citizens in
the United Kingdom compared to those in the United States.
Additional independent variables control for economic perceptions, other val-
ues, and demographic characteristics. A four-item additive index measures ret-
rospective and prospective evaluations of participants’ national and household
economic situations (αUK = 0.80, αUS = 0.85).15 Next, we include measures of
universalism and conformity values to account for the possibility that other values
confound the relationships that we expect between nativism, free market beliefs,
and trade attitudes (Schwartz 1994; Caprara et al. 2006; Bayram 2015; Goren et al.
2016). Universalism is a “self-transcendance” value that suggests a “belief in the
interdependent nature of international relations” (Rathbun et al. 2016, 128). Con-
formity, in contrast, is a “conservation” value that stresses “social solidarity” as a
way to improve prospects for the in-group (Rathbun et al. 2016, 128). In Rathbun
et al.’s research on personal values and foreign policy attitudes, universalism is the
strongest predictor of cooperative internationalism, while the conservation dimen-
sion is the strongest predictor for militant internationalism and isolationism. Since
beliefs about trade capture an important if oft-overlooked aspect of international-
ism (Gravelle, Reifler, and Scotto 2017), our analyses account for these theoretically
relevant controls.
Finally, we account for relevant demographic factors (Hainmueller and Hiscox
2006; Guisinger 2017): race (a dummy variable coded 1 for white), gender (coded
1 for male), age (in years), education (dummy coded 1 for university graduate),
and employment status (dummy variables for full time, part time, unemployed, stu-
dent, retired, and others). An eleven-point scale captures left/right ideology, and
we include a seven-point scale—measured in the previous survey wave—to measure
attitudes about whether “the government has an essential role to play in regulating
the market.”
Results
Table 2 presents the results of 12 ordinary least-squares (OLS) models that regress
participants’ belief in the global (models 1–6) and national (models 7–12) benefits
of globalized trade on nativism, belief in the free market, and the interaction. The
table indicates which models include the full complement of control variables we
described above. The dependent variable and all continuous measures, except age,
are rescaled from 0 to 1. All models include survey weights based on population
parameters.16
15
An exploratory factor analysis revealed that evaluations of the economy loaded on a single dimension despite
questions that separately targeted the country, household, and prospective/retrospective assessments for each.
16
Results in table 2 are from a “two-step” approach to modeling (James, Mulaik, and Brett 1982; Anderson and
Gerbing 1988), whereby factor scores are first derived from a measurement model, with the regression models estimated
in a second step. This is done for practical purposes—the weighted least-squares with adjusted means and variances
(WLSMV) estimator appropriate for estimating a CFA when indicators are ordinal only is available in the Mplus software
package, while Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu’s (2019) kernel estimation procedure to plot the marginal effects from
the interaction is implemented in R. However, the “two-step” approach has strident critics, both from a model fitting
perspective (Hayduk 1996) and due to concerns about biases in the means, variances, and relations with other variables
when using derived factor scores in a two-step procedure (Skrondal and Laake 2001). For this reason, we perform a
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Models 1, 4, 7, and 10 provide support for hypotheses 1a and 1b, and confirm our
expectations that both economic and cultural beliefs independently shape trade
attitudes. In both the United States and United Kingdom, significant coefficients
show a negative association between nativism and the belief that trade benefits the
world (bUS = −0.42, bUK = −0.31, both p < 0.01) or the nation (bUS = −0.37,
bUK = −0.26, both p < 0.01). The same people who believe in closing their bor-
ders to immigrants are less likely to believe that globalized trade has positive conse-
quences. This finding complements existing research on the relationship between
out-group anxiety (Mansfield and Mutz 2009) or cultural fears (Margalit 2012) and
protectionism, but with a key addition: Nativists are not just concerned about dam-
age at home—they are unpersuaded that trade is good for developing countries,
either. This finding supports our theory about nativism as a core value that guides
how people think about the consequences from open trading in general.
We find that people who embrace free markets extend their commitment to the
international realm—lowering barriers to trade brings global benefits (bUS = 0.07,
bUK = 0.17, both p < 0.01) just as the invisible hand improves living standards at
home (bUS = 0.05, bUK = 0.26, both p < 0.01). The effect is positive and statistically
significant in both samples, though nearly three times larger in the United Kingdom
than in the United States. The substantive effect of a one-unit change in nativism
on beliefs about global benefits is consistently large compared to a one-unit change
in belief in the free market—5.6 times larger in the US sample and 1.8 times in the
UK sample.
The main effects of nativism and belief in the free market are consistent with our
expectations, but the remaining models in table 2 provide evidence for an impor-
tant interaction: Nativism moderates the relationship between free market beliefs
and beliefs about trade’s positive effects on the nation and world. The interaction
coefficient is negative and statistically significant across countries and outcomes,
indicating that the effect of free market beliefs weakens among more nativist re-
spondents.
To illustrate the relationship belief in the free market and beliefs about trade
conditional on nativism, we follow Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu’s (2019) advice
and use their kernel estimation procedure to plot marginal effects without assuming
a linear functional form. This method uses a five-fold least-squares cross-validation
procedure to estimate local effects across the range of nativism. Estimates include
the full complement of controls included in models 3, 6, 9, and 12. Panels (a) and
(b) in figure 1 plot the marginal effect of free market endorsement on beliefs about
the global benefits of globalized trade, conditional on nativism, while panels (c) and
(d) plot the same quantity of interest on beliefs about trade’s effects on the nation.
All four panels display a clear downward trend: The marginal effect of free mar-
ket decreases as nativism increases. Among nativists, people who support the free
market at home are less likely to translate that support into their beliefs about the
effects of international trade. Panel (a) shows that in the United States, the esti-
mated effect of belief in the free market on beliefs that globalized trade has global
benefits approaches 0 when nativism reaches 0.55 (the 70th percentile). Panel (c)
shows a similarly large decrease in the marginal effect on beliefs about the national
consequences of economic globalization. Indeed, the effect of free market beliefs
is negative among the most ardent American nativists. For Americans who are ani-
mated by cultural homogeneity, economic principles do not usurp their belief that
trade barriers create important benefits. The invisible hand reigns at home, but not
in foreign interactions.
In the United Kingdom (panel b), the interaction is notably weaker albeit still sig-
nificant. Whereas marginal effect estimates dip below zero among the most nativist
results in Online Appendix Section 5. Overall model fit statistics remain adequate across all specifications, and the signs
and magnitude of the coefficients of the nativism, belief in the free market, and interaction predictors are comparable
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Figure 1 Beliefs about global trade in the United States and United Kingdom..
Notes: The figures display the marginal effects of belief in the free market on beliefs
about the benefits of global trade for the world (top row) and national economic inter-
ests (bottom row), across values of nativism. Estimates are obtained via a kernel estima-
tion procedure with five-fold least-squares cross-validation using the interflex package
in R (Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2019), which accounts for the possibility of a
non-linear interaction effect. Bands depict 95 percent confidence intervals from 1,000
bootstraps, and histograms plot the distribution of nativism in each sample. Estimates
are based on models 3, 6, 9, and 12 in table 2.
Americans, the conditional effect of belief in the free market on both the global
and national goods of trade is positive across the range of nativism in the United
Kingdom. Although our research design does not directly test contextual modera-
tors, this result comports with contemporary cross-national differences in partisan
connections between anti-immigration platforms and global economic policy—the
US GOP has turned more strongly against trade than nativist parties in the United
Kingdom. This result suggests that national context can shape the relationship be-
tween values and policy preferences, a point we return to in the conclusion.
Turning to the control variables, the results from models 3, 6, 9, and 12 show
that economic sentiment is positively associated with beliefs that global trade has
widespread benefits. This brings cross-national evidence to bear on a theory that has
been primarily tested in American samples. Our evidence adds external validity by
showing that in at least one additional Western democracy, economic perceptions
are associated with positive attitudes toward open trading.
University education is associated with positive beliefs about trade’s effects in
the United States (bglobal = 0.05, bnational = 0.04, both p < 0.01) (Hainmueller and
Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009), but this does not hold in the United King-
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trade benefits the nation (b = −0.02, p < 0.01).17 This finding suggests an important
avenue for future research into how variation in university curricula might affect
the relationship between education and trade attitudes, but we are wary of making
strong claims given the goals of the present study.18 Full-time students in the United
Kingdom appear to hold more positive beliefs about trade than their unemployed
counterparts, but the data do not reveal other consistent and substantively mean-
ingful relationships between employment status and our dependent variables.
Previous work finds that the personal values from Shalom Schwartz’s (1994) cir-
cumplex are related to foreign policy preferences (Rathbun et al. 2016). That work
implicates universalism and conservatism in particular, and we included those two
values to more clearly separate the effect of nativism from other values. Neither
universalism nor conformity values are related to beliefs about trade’s global ef-
fects, though universalist Americans are less likely to believe that globalized trade is
good for the nation (b = −0.06, p < 0.05). Conformity has a similarly small but pos-
itive coefficient in the American sample (b = 0.04, p < 0.05). Variation in the effect
of these core personal values would benefit from additional research into how the
antecedents of trade attitudes might differ from other foreign policy orientations
(Gravelle, Reifler, and Scotto 2017).
Nativism and the Limits of Economic Messages
Our survey results provide support for our theory that nativism is a core value that
shapes beliefs about trade and constrains the effect of free market ideology. The
observational evidence supports hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2—nativists tend to believe
the worst about global trade, and foreign antipathy outweighs free market attitudes.
In this section, we present the results of an experiment that builds on the correla-
tional evidence to test hypotheses 3 and 4. Given their commitment to the home-
land, will nativists update their beliefs and support free trade if they are exposed
to a message that describes the economic benefits from an open economy? Pre-
vious work demonstrates that trade attitudes are malleable (Guisinger 2017), but
also that people respond differently to economic information—some participants
in Rho and Tomz’s (2017) experiment reacted to distributional cues with altruism
rather than egoism, for example. We argue that on average people will respond to a
message about how the free market improves domestic job prospects with stronger
opposition to tariffs, but that people who hold nativist values will be less susceptible
to persuasion on the basis of trade’s economic effects. We analyze the results of a
survey experiment to test whether nativism moderates the effect of an important
macroeconomic message.
Methods and Results
We embedded a between-subjects experiment in wave 2 of the survey to assess the
effect of a message that describes how open trading leads to long-term economic
growth on support for lowering tariffs. All respondents read one message about pos-
sible short-term tradeoffs from tariff reductions: Free trade reduces poverty abroad
and lowers the cost of consumer goods, but also leads to domestic job losses in spe-
cific industries. Via random assignment, half of the sample received an additional
message (in italics below) about long-term economic growth prospects, noting that
when poor countries develop, they become a new market for goods and services,
17
See Online Appendix Section 4 for complete results.
18
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which ultimately improves the developed countries’ economies and encourages job
growth.19
One way that rich countries could reduce poverty in the developing world is to lower
trade restrictions, allowing developing countries to sell more goods like food and
clothing products. Lowering these trade restrictions would lower prices in rich coun-
tries for food and clothing, but would also cause significant job losses in these indus-
tries. However, as poor countries continue to grow their economies through exports, they will be
able to buy more products and services from developed countries, resulting in economic growth
and new jobs for the developed countries. Overall, would you support or oppose rich coun-
tries lowering trade barriers allowing developing countries to sell more goods like
food and clothing?
We focus on these long-run, downstream advantages because they demonstrate a
potentially persuasive political argument in favor of trade even as many economists
focus their research on short- and medium-term consequences from opening ex-
port markets.20 Per this logic, trade makes groceries more affordable, but also re-
dounds to the benefit of American or British workers by driving growth and creating
future employment opportunities. The Obama administration implored the public
to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership using this logic, for example: “The more
we sell abroad, the more higher-paying jobs we support here at home.”21 The de-
pendent variable is a five-point scale from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support,”
rescaled to range from 0 to 1. We measure nativism with the same additive scale as
reported above, rescaled to range from 0 to 1.22
We find that this simple message about how trade generates long-term gains for
developed countries increases support for lowering trade barriers, relative to the
condition where participants learned only about developing country gains and na-
tional losses. Figure 2 plots means and 95 percent confidence intervals by country
and condition, where higher values represent greater support for free trade. While
UK residents are more supportive of removing trade barriers than their US coun-
terparts, the treatment effect is comparable across samples: Mean support is 0.044
units higher among both Americans (t = −4.49, p < 0.01) and Britons (t = −4.81,
p < 0.01) assigned to the treatment group.
These results provide cross-national support for hypothesis 3 and evidence that
messages touting the benefits of free markets for national job gains may counteract
protectionism in Western democracies (Guisinger 2017; Mutz and Kim 2017). Im-
portantly, results presented in Online Appendix Section 8 show that the treatment
effect is not limited to the most educated citizens. We find no interaction between
19
Importantly, our vignette and treatment focus on one plausible argument about costs and benefits from trade, but
the reality of trade’s effects on jobs entails much more nuance and debate than we present in the experimental prompt.
For example, economists point out that protectionist policies sometimes cause immediate domestic job losses—tariffs
might help keep jobs in “upstream” industries like steel producers, but lead to cuts in “downstream” producers like
tractor companies who rely on steel to make their products and immediately must pay more for the raw materials (Irwin
2017). The net effect of trade in goods on jobs in the short term, then, might be neutral insofar as lower tariffs reduce
jobs in inefficient industries but increase available jobs in other industries. In the medium term, however, research
on the Chinese import shock shows that import competition caused widespread job losses in the United States, and
that these job losses were not offset by new jobs in industries that were not exposed to new competition (Acemoglu
et al. 2016, S183). Our view of the political debate around trade—perhaps because of the Chinese import shock—is
that those advocating against trade have successfully framed the issue as generating immediate costs. Our experimental
prompt was designed to offer an argument about long-term benefits as a competing consideration rather than a direct
refutation.
20
We additionally chose to write the experimental prompt as a form of intertemporal choice or delay discounting
problem—will an expression of long-term benefits overcome an expression of near- or medium-term losses? While
some public figures may advocate for trade by emphasizing nearer term gains (perhaps even concentrating on gains for
certain sectors), we chose not to focus on those types of messages here.
21
The White House, President Barack Obama.“What’s at Stake: Writing the Rules to Support American Jobs.” Ac-
cessed 9 August 2019.
22
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Figure 2 Support for free trade in the United States and United Kingdom.
Notes: The figure displays the mean degree of support where 0 represents “strongly op-
pose” and 1 represents “strongly support” with 95 percent confidence intervals.
the treatment and holding a university degree in the United States, whereas a signif-
icant interaction in the United Kingdom indicates that the effect of the treatment is
weaker in the most educated segment of the sample (b = −0.045, p < 0.05)—those
who are already favorably disposed toward open trading (b = 0.05, p < 0.05).
To test hypothesis 4, which states nativism moderates the effect of the economic
message, we estimate OLS models that regress support for free trade on the treat-
ment, nativism, and the interaction.23 In both countries, negative coefficients on
nativism (bUS = −0.24, bUK = −0.26, both p < 0.01) comport with our expectation
that nativism and protectionism go hand in hand among participants in the control
group.
We find mixed support for our hypothesis that nativism moderates the effect of
the pro-market message. In the United States, we observe a clear interaction (b =
−0.089, p = 0.052).24 Participants who reject nativist sentiments respond more pos-
itively to the treatment compared to their high nativism counterparts. They express
more support for free trade in general, and respond positively to the prospect of
new jobs in developed countries. By contrast, the OLS estimate for the interaction
coefficient is non-significant in the UK sample.
Figure 3 plots the effect of the treatment conditional on nativism in both samples.
Panel (a) shows that nativist Americans do not change their attitudes in response
to a message designed to shift their macroeconomic beliefs, consistent with our ex-
pectations that values limit the effect of lower-order beliefs. Panel (b) shows that in
the United Kingdom, the treatment effect is positive across the range of our moder-
ating variables. We find some evidence that the treatment effect is smaller at higher
levels of nativism, but the confidence interval indicates substantial uncertainty. This
23
Full regression results are presented in Online Appendix Section 7.
24
To further evaluate the difference in treatment effect among the most nativist and least nativist parts of our
sample, we conducted a post hoc analysis in which we split the sample into terciles on the nativism moderator. We
find evidence for a significant interaction between an indicator for low nativism—people who scored in the bottom 33
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Figure 3 Nativism moderates the effect of treatment in the United States..
Notes: The figures display the marginal effects of the treatment on support for free trade
across values of nativism. Estimates are obtained via a kernel estimation procedure with
five-fold least-squares cross-validation using the interflex package in R (Hainmueller,
Mummolo, and Xu 2019), which accounts for the possibility of a non-linear interaction
effect. Bands depict 95 percent confidence intervals from 1,000 bootstraps, and his-
tograms plot the distribution of nativism in each sample. Nativism and the dependent
variable have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
finding suggests that nativism’s constraining effect on trade attitudes may depend
on national context. In a national environment rhetorically tilted more toward free
trade, nativist and non-nativist Britons alike respond to a positive economic message
by increasing their support for tariff reductions. In Online Appendix Section 11, we
show that nativism is uniquely important—neither ideology nor partisanship inter-
acts with the economic message treatment in the United States or United Kingdom.
Although our results show that nativism moderates the treatment in the United
States, our approach does not allow us to adjudicate exactly what participants glean
from the prompt or the extent to which they update their broader economic belief
system. The treatment message describes how the free market benefits national and
global economies, but it potentially implicates both self- and national-interests by
targeting jobs. We would encourage future work to explore whether one account
is better than the other. Moreover, both the treatment and control groups include
information about how developing countries also win from free trade. This makes
relative gain concerns salient, and nativists might join people with high social domi-
nance orientations in eschewing relative losses (Mutz and Kim 2017). This concern
over relative gains suggests a further avenue for research exploring whether nativists
oppose free trade even when politicians frame it as a win–win proposition; those
concerned with relative gains would perhaps only support free trade if domestic
gains far exceed foreign gains. Similarly, American nativists might update their be-
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Conclusion
Research on trade attitudes is divided about whether members of the public prior-
itize economics or values related to in-group protection and out-group antipathy
when they think about trade. Our findings, summarized in table 3, affirm existing
theories and evidence about symbolic values and economics, but add important
new wrinkles. First, in the case of free market beliefs and nativism, our theoreti-
cal and empirical frameworks suggest that the latter constrains the former. Those
higher in nativism are more likely to believe that trade has negative domestic and
international consequences, and nativism weakens the connection between beliefs
about what makes a domestic economy thrive and beliefs about trade. This find-
ing has important implications for the debate between symbolic and economic ex-
planations, but also for a growing body of research on how competing predisposi-
tions interact with each other to shape foreign policy public opinion (Hurwitz and
Peffley 1987; Prather 2017; Rathbun, Powers, and Anders 2019). Moreover, it
suggests fruitful paths for engagement with the recent wave of research on the
individual- and community-level effects from import shocks. The influx of competi-
tion created a rightward and authoritarian shift in both the United States and the
United Kingdom (Ballard-Rosa, Jensen, and Scheve 2018; Colantone and Stanig
2018), and our research suggests that preexisting values might moderate the ef-
fects of such exogenous shocks on attitudes and economic policy preferences. We
encourage future research to further explore this possibility.
Second, our observational evidence reveals a similar pattern in both the United
States and the United Kingdom, but our experiment suggests that national context
might shape the degree to which nativist values constrain support for open eco-
nomics. This finding is striking in light of the fact that much existing research on
foreign policy public opinion aims to describe fundamental relationships, and past
work provides evidence that belief systems have similar structures in the United
States and United Kingdom (Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron 2004; Reifler,
Scotto, and Clarke 2011; Margalit 2012; Gravelle, Reifler, and Scotto 2017). Yet
if context and elite messaging influence how tightly people tie their nativist val-
ues to specific policy preferences (Knoll and Shewmaker 2015), structural rela-
tionships can differ even in two otherwise similar Western populations (Scotto and
Reifler 2017): For example, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) morphed from a






H1a: Nativism will be associated with negative beliefs
about trade’s effects on the nation and the world.
 
H1b: Free market beliefs will be associated with
positive beliefs about trade’s effects on the nation and
the world.
 
H2: Nativism will moderate the relationship between
belief in the free market and beliefs about trade. The
positive relationship between belief in the free market
and trade attitudes will weaken as nativism increases.
 (though
weaker)
H3: Exposure to a political message touting trade’s
long-term national benefits will increase support for
free trade.
 
H4:Nativism will moderate the effect of a political
message touting trade’s long-term national benefits.









niversity of Exeter user on 05 July 2021
KATHLEEN E. POWERS ET AL. 19
single-issue anti-EU party to a nativist party whose 2012 manifesto read “Britain for
the British first”25—but the party’s message also embraced free trade as a route
to prosperity.26 And recent research shows that polarization shapes the effect of
elite cues (Guisinger and Saunders 2017). If free trade was less polarized in the
United Kingdom compared to the United States, expert messages targeted at updat-
ing free market beliefs should be enough to move opinion, whereas nativist Amer-
icans might require a message from a party leader before they shift their attitudes.
Alternatively, nativist citizens could influence party platforms, a possibility we re-
turn to below. Although our study was not designed to test important contextual
moderators like elite messaging or polarization—we focus on bottom-up influences
on public opinion rather than top-down factors—our findings highlight the added
value in pursuing comparative research on foreign policy public opinion and sug-
gest important avenues for future work (Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 1993; Bjereld
and Ekengren 1999; Fattore and Fitzpatrick 2016; Wu 2019).
Our findings are especially interesting because nativism and free market beliefs
are not only correlated with one another but historically tied to right-of-center par-
ties. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher each advocated for—and
doggedly pursued—classically liberal economic policies. President Reagan was effu-
sive in his praise for Milton Friedman, an economist renowned for his passionate
defense of free markets. Prime Minister Thatcher made radical changes by dramat-
ically reducing state control and support of industry in the United Kingdom.
The nativist tendencies of recent US and UK leaders have been plain to see. Don-
ald Trump spent 2012 reviving the long discredited “birther” conspiracy against
President Obama, and in 2016 ran on an anti-immigration platform. Former Prime
Minister Theresa May pursued a policy designed to create a “hostile environment”
toward illegal immigrants as Home Secretary. She paid for billboard vans to circu-
late in immigrant communities with the message “Go home or face arrest,” moved
to deport legal residents who migrated from the Caribbean in the 1960s (the “Win-
drush” scandal), tightened family migration and student visas, and imposed stricter
limits on work visas for those from non-EU countries. Current Prime Minister
Boris Johnson wrote in an August 2018 Daily Telegraph column that Muslim women
wearing veils “go around looking like letter boxes” and compared them to bank
robbers.27
But Trump has also radically transformed the economic platform of the Repub-
lican Party—far from Reagan’s embrace of the free markets, the 2020 GOP can-
cels free trade agreements and imposes tariffs. The Conservative Party’s drive to
undo a lasting part of their 1970s’ legacy under Prime Minister Edward Heath and
a cause championed by Thatcher early in her Prime Ministerial tenure—the UK’s
EU membership—is a staggeringly bold reversal of the Party’s heritage. And, just
recently, Prime Minister Boris Johnson has sealed Britain’s exit from the EU. De-
spite his frequent rhetoric extolling free trade and a “global Britain,” he also sig-
nals a turn away from a comprehensive free trade deal with the EU. Although ob-
servers discuss “Canada” or “Norway” style trading arrangements for the post-Brexit
United Kingdom, Prime Minister Johnson suggested a much more distant relation-
ship when he suggested that an “Australian” style deal—which is not a free trade
arrangement—is an acceptable path forward.
What we find especially intriguing is the possibility that our data presaged these
dramatic changes in the economic orientations of the Republican and Conserva-
tive parties. These transformations are perhaps especially noteworthy because one
25
UKIP, “Shaping the Future: UKIP’s Straight Talking Manifesto for the Local Government Elections 2012”, p. 5.
Accessed October 26, 2018.
26
UKIP, “Britain Together: UKIP 2017 Manifesto”, p. 47. Accessed October 26, 2018.
27
Johnson, Boris. “Denmark Has Got It Wrong. Yes, the Burka Is Oppressive and Ridiculous—but That’s Still No







niversity of Exeter user on 05 July 2021
20 How Nativism and Economic Ideology Interact to Shape Beliefs about Global Trade
could argue that they were largely bottom-up. In the United States, Trump won the
Republican nomination in 2016 despite widespread elite opposition. In the United
Kingdom, the story is more nuanced, but the Tories repositioned themselves to pre-
vent voters from fleeing to Nigel Farage and UKIP. Our data suggest that these turns
away from classical economic liberalism and economic globalization are rooted in
the negative interaction we observe. In our data, right-of-center voters still endorse
free markets (large majorities of Republicans and Tories agreed that “people are
better off in a free market economy”), but the extent to which this endorsement
results in greater support for free trade and economic globalization declines with
greater nativist sentiment. As nativist rhetoric has taken center stage in these parties,
perhaps the parties’ turn away from their historic support from economic liberalism
is not so surprising.
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available in the Foreign Policy Analysis data archive.
REFERENCES
ACEMOGLU, DARON, DAVID AUTOR, DAVID DORN, GORDON H. HANSON, AND BRENDAN PRICE. 2016. “Import Com-
petition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s.” Journal of Labor Economics 34(S1): S141–
S198.
ANDERSON, JAMES C., AND DAVID W. GERBING. 1988. “Structural Equation Modeling in Practice: A Review and
Recommended Two-Step Approach.” Psychological Bulletin 103(3): 411.
AUTOR, DAVID H., DAVID DORN, AND GORDON H. HANSON. 2013. “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market
Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review 103(6): 2121–68.
BALLARD-ROSA, CAMERON, AMALIE JENSEN, AND KENNETH SCHEVE. 2018. Economic Decline, Social Identity,
and Authoritarian Values in the United States. Boston, MA: American Political Science Association.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tkoTac-uZgMXL0VYvzaAC_GcdLNBGDpV/view.
BAYRAM, A. B.. 2015. “What Drives Modern Diogenes? Individual Values and Cosmopolitan Allegiance.”
European Journal of International Relations 21(2): 451–79.
BEARCE, DAVID H., AND SAMANTHA L. MOYA. 2020. “Why Is the Mass Public Not More Supportive of Free
Trade? Evidence from the United States.” International Studies Quarterly 64(2): 380–91.
BEAULIEU, E. 2002. “Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy? An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper–
Samuelson Theorem.” Economics & Politics 14(2): 99–131.
BEAULIEU, E., R. A. YATAWARA, AND W. G. WANG. 2005. “Who Supports Free Trade in Latin America?” The
World Economy 28(7): 941–58.
BECHTEL, M. M., T. BERNAUER, AND R. MEYER. 2012. “The Green Side of Protectionism: Environmental
Concerns and Three Facets of Trade Policy Preferences.” Review of International Political Economy 19(5):
837–66.
BJERELD, ULF, AND ANN-MARIE EKENGREN. 1999. “Foreign Policy Dimensions: A Comparison between the
United States and Sweden.” International Studies Quarterly 43(3): 503–18.
BUSSMANN, MARGIT, AND GERALD SCHNEIDER. 2007. “When Globalization Discontent Turns Violent: Foreign
Economic Liberalization and Internal War.” International Studies Quarterly 51(1): 79–97.
CAPRARA, G. V., S. H. SCHWARTZ, C. CAPANNA, M. VECCHIONE, AND C. BARBARANELLI. 2006. “Personality and
Politics: Values, Traits, and Political Choice.” Political Psychology 27(1): 1–28.
CHITTICK, WILLIAM O., KEITH R. BILLINGSLEY, AND RICK TRAVIS. 1995. “A Three-Dimensional Model of Ameri-
can Foreign Policy Beliefs.” International Studies Quarterly 39(3): 313–31.
COLANTONE, ITALO, AND PIERO STANIG. 2018. “The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Compe-
tition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe.” American Journal of Political Science 62(4): 936–53.
DOVLO, DELANYO. 2007. “Migration of Nurses from Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Issues and Chal-
lenges.” Health Services Research 42(3): 1373–88.
FATTORE, CHRISTINA, AND BRIAN FITZPATRICK. 2016. “Perceived Inequality and Support for Trade Liberaliza-
tion in Latin America.” Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 15(2/3): 102–14.
FELDMAN, STANLEY, AND CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTON. 2014. “Understanding the Determinants of Political Ideol-
ogy: Implications of Structural Complexity.” Political Psychology 35(3): 337–58.
FORDHAM, B. O., AND K. B. KLEINBERG. 2012. “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free







niversity of Exeter user on 05 July 2021
KATHLEEN E. POWERS ET AL. 21
GOLDSTEIN, JUDITH, AND ROBERT OWEN KEOHANE. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
GOREN, PAUL. 2005. “Party Identification and Core Political Values.” American Journal of Political Science
49(4): 881–96.
GOREN, PAUL, HARALD SCHOEN, JASON REIFLER, THOMAS SCOTTO, AND WILLIAM CHITTICK. 2016. “A Unified The-
ory of Value-Based Reasoning and US Public Opinion.” Political Behavior 38(4): 977–97.
GRAVELLE, TIMOTHY B., JASON REIFLER, AND THOMAS J. SCOTTO. 2017. “The Structure of Foreign Policy Atti-
tudes in Transatlantic Perspective: Comparing the United States, United Kingdom, France and Ger-
many.” European Journal of Political Research 56(4): 757–76.
GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA. 2009. “Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?” Inter-
national Organization 63(3): 533–57.
GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA. 2017. American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA, AND ELIZABETH N. SAUNDERS. 2017. “Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How
Elites Shape Mass Opinion across International Issues.” International Studies Quarterly 61(2): 425–41.
HAIDT, JONATHAN. 2001. “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
Judgment.” Psychological Review 108(4): 814–34.
HAIDT, JONATHAN, AND JESSE GRAHAM. 2007. “When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral
Intuitions that Liberals May not Recognize.” Social Justice Research 20(1): 98–116.
HAINMUELLER, J., AND M. J. HISCOX. 2006. “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Atti-
tudes toward International Trade.” International Organization 60(02): 469–98.
HAINMUELLER, JENS, JONATHAN MUMMOLO, AND YIQING XU. 2019. “How Much Should We Trust Estimates
from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple tools to Improve Empirical Practice.” Political Analysis
27(2): 163–92.
HAYDUK, LESLIE A. 1996. LISREL Issues, Debates and Strategies. Baltimore, MA: JHU Press.
HERRMANN, RICHARD K., PHILIP E. TETLOCK, AND MATTHEW N. DIASCRO. 2001. “How Americans Think about
Trade: Reconciling Conflicts among Money, Power, and Principles.” International Studies Quarterly
45(2): 191–218.
HERRMANN, RICHARD K., PIERANGELO ISERNIA, AND PAOLO SEGATTI. 2009. “Attachment to the Nation and In-
ternational Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and Peace.” Political
Psychology 30(5): 721–54.
HISCOX, M. J. 2006. “Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious
Effects of Issue Framing.” International Organization 60(03): 755–80.
HOMOLA, JONATHAN, MIGUEL M. PEREIRA, AND MARGIT TAVITS. 2020. “Legacies of the Third Reich: Concentra-
tion Camps and Out-Group Intolerance.” American Political Science Review 114(2): 573–90.
HUDDY, LEONIE, AND ALEXA BANKERT. 2017. “Political Partisanship as a Social Identity.” In Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Accessed January 18, 2021. https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-250.
HURWITZ, JON, AND MARK PEFFLEY. 1987. “How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?” American Political
Science Review 81(4): 1099–120.
HURWITZ, JON, MARK PEFFLEY, AND MITCHELL A. SELIGSON. 1993. “Foreign Policy Belief Systems in Compara-
tive Perspective: The United States and Costa Rica.” International Studies Quarterly 37(3): 245–70.
IAKHNIS, EVGENIIA, BRIAN RATHBUN, JASON REIFLER, AND THOMAS J. SCOTTO. 2018. “Populist Referen-
dum: Was ‘Brexit’ an Expression of Nativist and Anti-Elitist Sentiment?” Research & Politics 5(2):
2053168018773964.
IRWIN, DOUGLAS A. 2017. “The False Promise of Protectionism: Why Trump’s Trade Policy Could Back-
fire.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-
17/false-promise-protectionism.
ISSP RESEARCH GROUP. 1995. “International Social Survey Programme: National Identity I-ISSP 1995.”
GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany. ZA No. 2880 Data file Version.
JAMES, LARRY R., STANLEY A. MULAIK, AND JEANNE M. BRETT. 1982. Causal Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
JENKINS-SMITH, HANK C., NEIL J. MITCHELL, AND KERRY G. HERRON. 2004. “Foreign and Domestic Policy Belief
Structures in the US and British Publics.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(3): 287–309.
JUNGHERR, ANDREAS, MATTHIAS MADER, HARALD SCHOEN, AND ALEXANDER WUTTKE. 2018. “Context-Driven At-
titude Formation: The Difference between Supporting Free Trade in the Abstract and Supporting
Specific Trade Agreements.” Review of International Political Economy 25(2): 215–42.
KALTENTHALER, KARL, AND WILLIAM J. MILLER. 2013. “Social Psychology and Public Support for Trade Liber-
alization.” International Studies Quarterly 57(4): 784–90.
KEELE, LUKE, RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON, AND FELIX ELWERT. 2020. “The Causal Interpretation of Estimated







niversity of Exeter user on 05 July 2021
22 How Nativism and Economic Ideology Interact to Shape Beliefs about Global Trade
KERTZER, JOSHUA D., AND KATHLEEN E. POWERS. 2019. “Foreign Policy Attitudes as Networks.” In Oxford Hand-
book of Behavioral Political Science, edited by Alex Mintz and Lesley Terris. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1–31.
KERTZER, JOSHUA D., PABLO BARBERÁ, ANDREW GUESS, SIMON MUNZERT, JUNGHWAN YANG, AND ANDI ZHOU. 2019.
“Trade Attitudes in the Wild: Information, Interests, and the Origins of Individual-Level Trade Pref-
erences.” https://people.fas.harvard.edu/jkertzer/Research_files/Kertzer-IPES.pdf.
KINDER, DONALD R., AND CINDY D. KAM. 2010. Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
KLEINBERG, KATJA B., AND BENJAMIN O. FORDHAM. 2017. “Don’t Know Much about Foreign Policy: Assess-
ing the Impact of ‘Don’t Know’ and ‘No Opinion’ Responses on Inferences about Foreign Policy
Attitudes.” Foreign Policy Analysis 14(3): 429–48.
KNOLL, BENJAMIN R., AND JORDAN SHEWMAKER. 2015. “‘Simply Un-American’: Nativism and Support for
Health Care Reform.” Political Behavior 37(1): 87–108.
KUO, J., AND M. NAOI. 2015. “Individual Attitudes.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of Inter-
national Trade, edited by Lisa L. Martin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 99–118.
LAKE, DAVID A. 2009a. “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review.” The Review of International Organizations
4(3): 219–44.
LAKE, DAVID A. 2009b. “TRIPs across the Atlantic: Theory and Epistemology in IPE.” Review of International
Political Economy 16(1): 47–57.
LODGE, MILTON, AND CHARLES S. TABER. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
MCCONNAUGHY, CORRINE M., ISMAIL K. WHITE, DAVID L. LEAL, AND JASON P. CASELLAS. 2010. “A Latino on
the Ballot: Explaining Coethnic Voting Among Latinos and the Response of White Americans.” The
Journal of Politics 72(4): 1199–211.
MALHOTRA, NEIL, YOTAM MARGALIT, AND CECILIA HYUNJUNG MO. 2013. “Economic Explanations for Opposi-
tion to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact.” American Journal
of Political Science 57(2): 391–410.
MANSFIELD, E. D., AND D. C. MUTZ. 2009. “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and
Out-Group Anxiety.” International Organization 63(03): 425–57.
MARGALIT, YOTAM. 2012. “Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of
Popular Discontent.” International Studies Quarterly 56(3): 484–500.
MASON, LILLIANA. 2015. “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social
and Issue Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59(1): 128–45.
MAYDA, A. M., AND D. RODRIK. 2005. “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than
Others?” European Economic Review 49(6): 1393–430.
MILNER, HELEN V. 1999. “The Political Economy of International Trade.” Annual Review of Political Science
2(1): 91–114.
MILNER, HELEN V., AND KEIKO KUBOTA. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy
in the Developing Countries.” International Organization 59(1): 107–43.
MUDDE, CAS. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MUTZ, DIANA C., AND EUNJI KIM. 2017. “The Impact of Ingroup Favoritism on Trade Preferences.” Interna-
tional Organization 71(4): 827–50.
OWEN, ERICA, AND NOEL P. JOHNSTON. 2017. “Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routine-
ness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment.” International Organization 71(4): 665–99.
OWEN, ERICA, AND STEFANIE WALTER. 2017. “Open Economy Politics and Brexit: Insights, Puzzles, and Ways
forward.” Review of International Political Economy 24(2): 179–202.
PRATHER, LAUREN. 2017. “Values at the Water’s Edge: Social Welfare Values and Foreign
Aid.” http://www.laurenprather.org/uploads/2/5/2/3/25239175/prather_-_values_at_the_waters_
edge.pdf.
RATHBUN, BRIAN. 2016. “Wedges and Widgets: Liberalism, Libertarianism, and the Trade Attitudes of the
American Mass Public and Elites.” Foreign Policy Analysis 12(1): 85–108.
RATHBUN, BRIAN C., JOSHUA D. KERTZER, JASON REIFLER, PAUL GOREN, AND THOMAS J. SCOTTO. 2016. “Taking
Foreign Policy Personally: Personal Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes.” International Studies Quarterly
60(1): 124–37.
RATHBUN, BRIAN C., KATHLEEN E. POWERS, AND THERESE ANDERS. 2019. “Moral Hazard: German Public Opin-
ion on the Greek Debt Crisis.”Political Psychology 40(3): 523–42.
REIFLER, JASON, THOMAS J. SCOTTO, AND HAROLD D. CLARKE. 2011. “Foreign Policy Beliefs in Contemporary
Britain: Structure and Relevance.” International Studies Quarterly 55(1): 245–66.
RHO, SUNGMIN, AND MICHAEL TOMZ. 2017. “Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?”







niversity of Exeter user on 05 July 2021
KATHLEEN E. POWERS ET AL. 23
RUSSETT, BRUCE M., AND JOHN R. ONEAL. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and Interna-
tional Organizations. New York, NY: Norton.
SAPOLSKY, ROBERT. 2019. “This Is Your Brain on Nationalism: The Biology of Us and Them.” Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/your-brain-nationalism.
SCHEVE, KENNETH F., AND MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER. 2001. “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Prefer-
ences?” Journal of International Economics 54(2): 267–92.
SCHILDKRAUT, DEBORAH J. 2005. Press “ONE” for English: Language Policy, Public Opinion, and American Identity.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
SCHWARTZ, SHALOM H. 1994. “Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Val-
ues?” Journal of Social Issues 50(4): 19–45.
SCOTTO, THOMAS J., AND JASON REIFLER. 2017. “Getting Tough with the Dragon? The Comparative Correlates
of Foreign Policy Attitudes Toward China in the United States and UK.” International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific 17(2): 265–99.
SIDES, JOHN, AND JACK CITRIN. 2007. “European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Inter-
ests and Information.” British Journal of Political Science 37(3): 477–504.
SKRONDAL, ANDERS, AND PETTER LAAKE. 2001. “Regression among Factor Scores.” Psychometrika 66(4): 563–
75.
VAN DER WAAL, JEROEN, AND WILLEM DE KOSTER. 2018. “Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Rele-
vance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands.”
Political Studies 66(3): 560–76.
WOLFE, ROBERT, AND MATTHEW MENDELSOHN. 2005. “Values and Interests in Attitudes toward Trade and
Globalization: The Continuing Compromise of Embedded Liberalism.” Canadian Journal of Political
Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 38(1): 45–68.
WOODWARD, IAN, ZLATKO SKRBIS, AND CLIVE BEAN. 2008. “Attitudes towards Globalization and Cosmopoli-
tanism: Cultural Diversity, Personal Consumption and the National Economy.” The British Journal of
Sociology 59(2): 207–26.
WU, WEN. 2019. “Big Government Sentiment and Support for Protectionism in East Asia.” International
Political Science Review 40(1): 73–89.
ZHIRKOV, KIRILL. 2014. “Nativist but Not Alienated: A Comparative Perspective on the Radical Right Vote







niversity of Exeter user on 05 July 2021
